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I. INTRODUCTION 
In California, any city may become a charter city by framing a charter 
and ratifying it by popular vote.1  Under the state’s constitution, the 
ordinances of a charter city supersede conflicting state law concerning 
“municipal affairs.”2  In 2012, the California Supreme Court held that “the 
wage levels of contract workers constructing locally funded public works are 
. . . ‘municipal affair[s]’” and thus that the state prevailing wage law could 
not apply to those contracts.3  While the legal impact of the decision remains 
uncertain,4 the California legislature has taken legislative action to render the 
holding of Trades Council irrelevant by fiscally coercing charter cities into 
abiding by the prevailing wage law.5  This legislation is now being 
challenged by a consortium of California charter cities on the grounds that it 
 
 1.  CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a). 
 2.  CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a) (“City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution[,] . . . with 
respect to municipal affairs[,] shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.”); see also JOSEPH R. 
GRODIN, CALVIN R. MASSEY & RICHARD B. CUNNINGHAM, THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION 
204 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (describing this doctrine as “the heart of the concept of home rule, a 
philosophy of local government autonomy employed in many states as a [limitation on] the powers 
of a state legislature”) [hereinafter GRODIN ET AL.]. 
 3.  See State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 558 
(2012).  See generally infra notes 122–62 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the 
prevailing wage law and related cases). 
 4.  See People v. Nguyen, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1168, 1187 (2014), petition for review filed (Feb. 
18, 2014) (citing a dissenting opinion from Trades Council to support the proposition that close 
cases must be decided in favor of the legislature); People v. Godinez, G047657, 2014 WL 99188 
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2014) (unpublished), petition for review filed (Feb. 18, 2014) (same); Stitt v. 
S.F. Mun. Transp. Agency, 12-CV-03704, 2013 WL 121259 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013) (commenting 
that Trades Council specifically left open the question of whether state minimum wage laws of 
broad general application could also be superseded by a local enactment that conflicted). 
 5.  See infra notes 267–73 and accompanying text (discussing SB7 and its implications for 
charter cities). 
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violates the Municipal Affairs Clause.6 
This Comment argues that the court in Trades Council reached the right 
result, but the rationale of the decision was unpersuasive.  The court’s 
current Municipal Affairs Clause doctrine, which embraces a case-by-case 
analysis, is unworkable as a matter of judicial review and is at odds with the 
text, history, and political theory of the clause itself.  The court has a 
constitutional duty to enforce the state’s constitution as the supreme law of 
the state, and that duty cannot be faithfully discharged as long as the court’s 
analysis is governed only by broad generalities that purport to “bring a 
measure of certainty” to a process characterized nonetheless by “mercurial 
discretion.”7  If the court adopts an interpretation faithful to the state 
constitution, the result in Trades Council must be considered correct and the 
recent legislation designed to circumvent the state constitution must be 
found unconstitutional as well.8 
Part II reviews the history of home rule in California and the origins of 
the Municipal Affairs Clause.9  Part III describes the development of the 
California Supreme Court’s analytical framework for applying the clause.10  
Part IV describes the background of the Trades Council litigation, the issues 
considered, and the court’s holdings.11  Part V advocates a new rule 
consistent with the text, purpose, and political theory of the state 
constitution.12  Part VI explains why the California Supreme Court should 
reconsider its approach to home rule cases and adopt the rule proposed in 
Part V.  Part VII analyzes SB7 under both standards and demonstrates the 
superiority of the proposed rule.13 
II. THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE AND THE MUNICIPAL 
AFFAIRS CLAUSE 
The California Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of 
 
 6.  See League Strongly Supports Important Charter City Home Rule Litigation (Feb. 21, 2014), 
LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, available at http://www.cacities.org/Top/News/News-
Articles/2014/February/League-Strongly-Supports-Important-Charter-City-Ho. 
 7.  Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 16 (1991). 
 8.  See infra notes 249–61 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See infra notes 14–108 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See infra notes 109–21 and accompanying text. 
 11.  See infra notes 122–63 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra notes 164–248 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See infra notes 266–91 and accompanying text. 
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history—specifically the history of conflict between the state and local 
governments—for the application of the Municipal Affairs Clause.14  Indeed, 
the clause itself is a product and a part of that history, and understanding its 
historical context is essential to constructing a better analytical framework. 
A. Dillon’s Rule and the Right of Local Self-Government 
City and town governments have been a crucial aspect of the American 
political experience from the time of the first colonial settlements.15  When 
Alexis De Tocqueville visited the young nation in the 1830s, he saw in the 
political life of the New England townships a form of liberty and self-
government essential to the American character.16  But the legal status of 
cities has been a matter of bitter contention in the United States, and the 
history of California’s city governments is a chapter in that broader story. 
The legal and political conflicts over the status of city government often 
overlap, and conflicting political theories have produced conflicting legal 
doctrines.17  The most widely accepted statement of the legal relationship 
between cities and state legislatures in America is the maxim known as 
“Dillon’s rule,”18 which states that “the power of the legislature over 
[municipal] corporations is supreme and transcendent: it may erect, change, 
divide, and even abolish them, at pleasure, as it deems the public good to 
require.”19  Judge John Dillon, for whom the rule is named, believed strong 
legislative control of cities would protect private rights by allocating power 
to the body most likely to consist of talented, public-spirited individuals.20  
 
 14.  State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 557 (2012). 
 15.  See generally EARNEST S. GRIFFITH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE 
COLONIAL PERIOD (Da Capo Press 1972). 
 16.  See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 61–63, 68–81 (Henry Reeve trans., 
7th ed. 1847). 
 17.  See generally Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local 
Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 83 (1986). 
 18.  It is widely acknowledged that Dillon’s rule is the mainstream of American judicial and 
academic opinion.  See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 
1115 (1980); 2 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.03, at 9 (3d ed. 1996).  As 
early as 1911, the victory of Dillon’s rule over the alternative theories was secure.  See 1 JOHN F. 
DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 98, at 154–56 (5th ed. 
1911). 
 19.  1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 54, at 75 
(3d ed., rev. 1881).   
 20.  Frug, supra note 18, at 1109–11.  This characterization is ironic when applied to the actual, 
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But despite its confident assertion, Dillon’s rule was an innovation in Anglo-
American jurisprudence rather than a statement of the obvious or traditional 
rule.  Though it was well established by the time of the founding that the 
chartered privileges of municipal corporations were secure from royal 
interference,21 the relationship between the legislative power and the rights 
of cities under charters was an open question of law.22 
Opposition to Dillon’s rule was most famously expressed in Justice 
Thomas Cooley’s concurring opinion in People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 
which involved an act of the Michigan legislature organizing a powerful 
“board of public works” that essentially replaced the existing government of 
Detroit.23  Cooley argued that the constitution of his state presupposed the 
prior and continued existence of local governments and could not reasonably 
be interpreted as permitting the abolition of that self-government.24  He 
concluded that “local government is [a] matter of absolute right; and the 
state cannot take it away.”25  He did not reject regulation of cities under 
general laws by the legislature, but he forcefully condemned special 
legislative interference in the exercise of local power.26  The legislature’s 
role, in Cooley’s view, was simply to provide for the incorporation of local 
governments and to then allow them to function independently.27  This legal 
alternative never gained widespread or sustained acceptance in the courts, 
but the political opposition to legislative supremacy gave rise to the adoption 
 
particular experience of state government in California under Dillon’s rule, at which time “few men 
of ability [were] active in political life, and the struggle for office was carried on among men of 
mediocre talent and often of doubtful integrity.  The legislators were of especially low caliber.”  
CARL BRENT SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1878–79, at 9 (1930). 
 21.  See An Act for Reversing the Judgment in a Quo Warranto against the City of London, 2 W. 
& M., c.8 (1689), reprinted in 6 STATUTES OF THE REALM 171. 
 22.  See Frug, supra note 18, at 1094. 
 23.  People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 52–53 (1871). 
 24.  See id. at 99–103 (Cooley, J., concurring) (citing the “historical fact” that “local 
governments universally, in this country, were either simultaneous with, or preceded, the more 
central authority.”).  Cooley’s argument was textual—it is not reasonable exegesis to conclude that 
fundamental social institutions and values should be discarded simply because they are not 
mentioned.  See Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 98 (Cooley, J., concurring).  Indeed, Cooley suggested, if 
Dillon’s rule were publicly asserted—rather than adopted by judicial construction—it “would be 
somewhat startling to our people.”  Id. at 97. 
 25.  Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 108 (Cooley, J., concurring). 
 26.  See id at 108. 
 27.  See id. at 111 (“The right in the state is a right, not to run and operate the machinery of local 
government, but to provide for and put it in motion.”). 
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of “home rule” amendments in state constitutions—including the Municipal 
Affairs Clause.28 
B. City Government Under the California Constitution of 1849 
California was certainly no exception to the universal American 
experience that “local governments . . . were either simultaneous with, or 
preceded, the more central authority.”29  Los Angeles, for example, was 
founded as a pueblo in the 1780s, over sixty years prior to the annexation of 
California by the United States.30  When the American forces led by 
Commodore Robert Stockton captured Los Angeles in 1846 and Stockton 
declared the territory under American control, these governments were 
permitted to continue operating.31  After annexation, the number of 
American settlers rapidly increased as miners came in search of gold.32  This 
led to a great expansion of the number of town governments in the state as 
the miners in the camps established local systems of government for 
themselves—systems that included majority rule, trial by jury, protection of 
property rights, and nonviolent means of dispute resolution.33  Despite this 
 
 28.  See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 
86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1341–42 (2009). 
 29.  Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 100 (Cooley, J., concurring). 
 30.  See George Butler Griffen, A Letter of Don Antonio F. Coronel to Father J. Adam on the 
Founding of the Pueblo of Los Angeles and the Building of the Church of Our Lady of the Angels, 
With a Translation and Corrections, 10 ANN. PUBLICATION HIST. SOC’Y S. CAL. 124, 124–26 
(1915–16).  The most prominent examples of pre-statehood local government in California were the 
towns, such as Los Angeles, that had once been Spanish missions but were secularized and made 
into civil governments under Mexican rule.  See generally JOHN S. HITTELL, A HISTORY OF THE 
CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO AND INCIDENTALLY OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 71–79 (1878). 
 31.  See JAMES MADISON CUTTS, THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO 124–25 
(1847). 
 32.  See HITTELL, supra note 30, at 132–33 (stating that in 1849 the number of settlers entering 
California was equal to three times the territory’s previous population). 
 33.  See generally Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the 
Development of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114 (2001).  Justice 
Stephen Field of the United States Supreme Court, himself a former California gold miner, described 
these legal systems as follows: 
Wherever they went, [the miners] carried with them that love of order and 
system and of fair dealing which are the prominent characteristics of our 
people.  In every district which they occupied they framed certain rules for 
their government . . . . [a]nd [their customs] were so framed as to secure to all 
comers, within practicable limits, absolute equality of right and privilege in 
working the mines.  Nothing but such equality would have been tolerated by 
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history, it does not appear that the delegates to the first California 
Constitutional Convention gave much thought to the general structure of city 
government.34  The resulting constitution said little on the subject: it 
exempted municipal corporations from the general rule that corporations 
must be formed under general laws rather than by special acts,35 provided 
that the legislature “shall establish a system of county and town 
governments,”36 and imposed on the legislature a duty to restrain municipal 
taxation.37  In the absence of more specific textual guidance, the California 
Supreme Court adopted—or rather, assumed without argument—Dillon’s 
rule, holding that: 
[Cities and counties] are both political and geographical 
divisions of the State.  They are both the subjects of its 
political dominion.  The local governments derive their 
powers from the paramount political head, which, while it 
cedes to certain local agents certain powers, does not 
thereby remit its rightful and ultimate dominion . . . .38 
Because cities and towns were understood to derive their existence and 
 
the miners, who were emphatically the law-makers, as respects mining, upon 
the public lands in the State. 
Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878).  The mining camp was, in the words of Californian 
philosopher Josiah Royce, “a little republic.”  Josiah Royce, California: From the Conquest in 1846 
to the Second Vigilance Committee in San Francisco 280 (1886). 
 34.  The only discussion of the subject appears in REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION 
OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 
1849, at 126–28, 136 (J. Ross Browne ed. 1850) [hereinafter FIRST CONVENTION]. 
 35.  CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 31. 
 36.  CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 4.  The mandatory language of this provision—“shall”—
supports the proposition that some form of city government was a constitutional minimum.  See 
People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 29–31 (1875) (arguing from the mandatory phrasing of the clause that 
the legislature is “required [to] organize cities and villages”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 11, at 112 (2012) (stating the 
rule that “shall” ordinarily denotes a mandatory duty). 
 37.  CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 37.  One notable commentator has argued on the basis of 
this clause that “the framers showed a greater distrust of local governments than they did of the state 
legislature.”  John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: I, 30 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1941) 
[hereinafter Peppin I] (citing CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 37).  The California Supreme Court 
relied on a similar interpretation to support its reasoning in People ex rel. Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 
343, 355–56 (1859).  But legislative power to limit specifically enumerated powers (taxation and 
assessment powers) is not the same as plenary legislative control. 
 38.  Pattison v. Bd. of Supervisors, 13 Cal. 175, 184 (1859). 
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powers from legislative acts, their decisions were subject to direct legislative 
intervention.39  Some of the special legislation passed under the first 
constitution was comically trivial micromanagement.40  In some instances, 
however, the interference was substantial.41  In People ex rel. O’Donnell, an 
early case, the attorney for the City of San Francisco argued that legislative 
interference in local affairs was never contemplated by the state 
constitution.42  But the Court rejected that argument, and Dillon’s rule 
became the law of the state.43  The power to alter city charters at will led to a 
rash of special interest legislation that greatly increased the complexity of 
city charters and produced uncertainty.44  The court even permitted the 
legislature to regulate city conduct on a case-by-case basis.45  Because the 
court reasoned that cities were “mere instrumentalities” for the exercise of 
state power, the power of the legislature over cities was absolutely plenary.46  
 
 39.  Although some acts passed during this period purported to “authorize” a municipal 
corporation to undertake some action, the California Supreme Court “early held that laws of this 
character would in many cases be construed as . . . mandatory.”  See Peppin I, supra note 37, at 17 
(citing Napa Valley R.R. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 30 Cal. 435 (1866)); see also id. at 18–19 nn.46–51 
(collecting examples of such statutes “authorizing” action by municipalities). 
 40.  See, e.g., 1875–1876 Cal. Stat. 180 (making it “unlawful for hogs or goats to run at large in 
the Town of Woodbridge”). 
 41.  See, e.g., People ex rel. O’Donnell v. Bd. of Supervisors, 11 Cal. 206, 211 (1858) (upholding 
a special act compelling the city to pay, from a specific fund, a specific claim owed to a specific 
private citizen based on the general proposition that the cities were subservient to the legislature). 
 42.  11 Cal. at 207 (“There are no authorities in this case.  Like parricide, against which the 
Romans had no law, because the crime was thought impossible, such an usurpation by the 
Legislature has never been contemplated or guarded against, and no Supreme Court of any State ever 
had to pass upon a doctrine so monstrous as that contended for by this . . . bill.”). 
 43.  See id. at 211.  This assertion of state supremacy, unsupported by legal authority, supports 
the argument that Dillon’s rule is not a legal deduction but actually “a political choice . . . derived 
from the hostility of liberal political thought to the exercise of power by entities intermediate 
between, and thus threatening the interests of, the state and the individual.”  Frug, supra note 22, at 
1059. 
 44.  See 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA 1060 (E.B. Willis & P.K. Stockton eds., 1881) [hereinafter SECOND CONVENTION] (Mr. 
Reynolds) (“Here is a volume of fine print, three hundred and nineteen pages, that comprises the 
charter of the City of San Francisco, to-day.  Originally it was thirty-one pages, but there have been 
one hundred supplemental Acts passed . . . .  Dozens of these Acts have been passed in the interest of 
a single individual.”). 
 45.  See People ex rel. Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343, 348–49 (1859) (upholding a bill 
compelling a city to issue debt in order to pay certain claims, which were not legally valid, but which 
the legislature thought just), overruled in part by People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 (1875). 
 46.  See id. at 350–51 (“The [only] security against the abuse of the power of the Legislature is to 
be found in the wisdom and sense of justice of its members, and their relation to their constituents.”).   
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The court justified its broad interpretation of legislative power based upon 
the distinction between the federal constitution, which is one of limited 
grant, and the state constitutions, which are understood as limiting 
documents governing an otherwise plenary legislative authority.47 
In perhaps the most egregious case of the period, the court upheld an act 
of the legislature compelling the city of Stockton to donate $300,000 in 
bonds to the construction of a privately owned railroad and levy a tax to pay 
the principal and interest on the bonds.48  The city was to acquire no 
financial interest whatsoever in the railroad; it was a pure donation.49  The 
city issued the bonds but refused to levy the tax, and the railroad company 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the levy.50  In its decision, the court 
essentially admitted the venality of the legislature, devoting considerable 
space to an argument that the separation of powers prevented courts from 
intervening to overturn even such obviously corrupt legislation.51 
In the early 1870s, the court’s acceptance of Dillon’s rule faltered.52  In 
the landmark case of Sinton v. Ashbury, the court announced the first 
meaningful limitation on the legislature’s control of municipal corporations: 
while the legislature could appropriate city funds for “municipal purposes” it 
could not do so for “purely private purpose[s].”53  This limit, however, was 
narrow, and the court continued to apply Dillon’s rule in subsequent cases.54  
 
 47.  Stockton, 41 Cal. at 161 (“[T]he Legislature is politically omnipotent, except in those 
particulars in which its power has been limited, qualified, or absolutely withdrawn by the provisions 
of the Federal or the State Constitution.)” (citing Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 160 
(1853)). 
 48.  See Stockton & Visalia R.R. v. Common Council of Stockton, 41 Cal. 147, 157 (1871). 
 49.  Id. at 152. 
 50.  Id. at 157. 
 51.  See id. at 157–58. 
 52.  Stockton was actually the first sign that Dillon’s rule was beginning to falter in California.  
Peppin I, supra note 37, at 25–26.  Three of the five justices concurred in the decision essentially on 
stare decisis grounds alone.  Id.; see also Stockton, 41 Cal. at 193–202.  Justice Crockett, in his 
concurrence, argued that the legislative act was valid only because it used public funds for a public 
purpose.  See Stockton, 41 Cal. at 194–95 (Crockett, J., concurring).  This distinction would later be 
essential to his decision in Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525 (1871). 
 53.  41 Cal. at 530.  The court used the phrase “municipal affairs,” which it appeared to equate 
with things done for “municipal purposes.”  See id. at 529–30.  The standard used to define this 
category is not clear from the opinion, but the court emphasized that “[t]he work . . . was clearly one 
of great public importance.”  Id. at 530. 
 54.  See, e.g., City of S.F. v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541, 552 (1872) (“[I]t is conceded that the 
Legislature may create, modify, or abolish [municipal] corporations, and may direct the mode and 
manner in which they shall exercise their powers, or may limit the extent of their powers . . . .”); 
Creighton v. Bd. of Supervisors, 42 Cal. 446 (1871).  
[Vol. 41: 587, 2014] Preserving Home Rule 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
596 
Finally, in People v. Lynch,55 the court rejected Dillon’s rule in favor of the 
doctrine expressed by Justice Cooley in Hurlbut.56  In Lynch, the City of 
Sacramento attempted to assess a tax on real property benefitted by a public 
improvement, but did not do so consistently with the city charter.57  To 
remedy this situation and ensure the collection of the tax, the state legislature 
itself passed an act levying the tax.58  The majority accepted Cooley’s 
general theory of state constitutions: that there are traditional, implied 
limitations on legislative power that must be assumed to have been intended 
by the public in ratification.59  Further development of these limitations, 
however, was rendered unnecessary by the adoption of California’s second 
constitution. 
C. Home Rule and the Constitution of 1879 
The California Constitution of 1879 was created to remedy the 
shortcomings of the original constitution.60  The convention was 
characterized by deep distrust of the legislature, which “can be observed 
both in the debates and in the finished document.”61  The new constitution 
included five provisions that protected city governments from the 
 
55 51 Cal. 15 (1875). 
 56.  See id. at 19 (“The inhabitants of a city cannot be deprived of their right to have such matters 
as are placed by the charter under the supervision and control of the legislative department of the 
city government, passed upon by their representatives in the city council. The Legislature cannot, in 
a special case, deny to the proper city authorities that discretion which they may ordinarily employ 
with respect to local improvements.”). 
 57.  See id. at 16–17. 
 58.  See id. at 18–19. 
 59.  See id. at 29–33 (arguing that the framers viewed local government as essential).  Justices 
Wallace and Rhodes disagreed on the basis of stare decisis.  See id. at 40–41 (Wallace, J., concurring 
specially). 
 60.  See SWISHER, supra note 20, at 4–6, 9 (describing the massive population growth, economic 
instability, and monopolization that combined to create a class of unemployed and disgruntled men 
who would form the backbone of the “Workingmen’s Party,” a major political force in the 
convention); Noel Sargent, The California Constitutional Convention of 1878-9, 6 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 
(1917) (describing the Workingmen’s Party, which thrived on anti-Chinese racism, antagonism 
toward the capitalist class, and the widespread discontentment of unemployed laborers).  
 61.  Sargent, supra note 60, at 2.  Much suspicion of the legislature derived from the belief that 
its power was captive to railroad interests.  See, e.g., 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 1062 
(Mr. Joyce) (responding to the suggestion of legislative approval of charters by asking: “Does he 
want to have the charter of San Francisco adopted that way, so the railroad company can rob us as 
they have for years past . . . ?”). 
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legislature, and taken together, are the basis of municipal home rule62: the 
prohibition of special legislation,63 the prohibition of special incorporation,64 
the grant of a general police power to cities,65 the requirement that local 
taxes be levied locally,66 the prohibition of dividing municipal authority,67 
and the provision for freehold charters.68  The effect of the first four clauses, 
taken together, was to prohibit micromanagement by the state legislature and 
limit it to passing “general laws.”69 
The subject of freehold charters was the cause of much debate over the 
nature and role of local government at the second constitutional 
convention.70  One faction, which included several delegates from San 
Francisco and Los Angeles, was deeply skeptical of the legislature and 
strongly favored local autonomy.  Their floor speeches included tales of 
egregious legislative abuse,71 angry outbursts against centralized control,72 
 
 62.  Cf. John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: II, 30 CAL. L. REV. 272, 272–73 
(1942) (discussing these five provisions). 
 63.  CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. IV, § 25 (prohibiting special legislation concerning a long list of 
subjects). 
 64.  Id. art. XI, § 6 (“Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws . . 
. [but] by general laws . . . .”). 
 65.  Id. art. XI, § 11 (“Any county, city, town, or township, may make and enforce within its 
limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”). 
 66.  Id. art. XI, § 12 (“The Legislature shall have no power to impose taxes . . . [for] municipal 
purposes, but may, by general laws, vest [such power in a local public entity].”). 
 67.  Id. art. XI, § 13 (“The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission [or private 
party] any power . . . [over] any municipal functions whatever.”). 
 68.  Id. art. XI, § 8 (“Any city containing a population of more than one hundred thousand 
inhabitants may frame a charter for its own government . . . .”). 
 69.  2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 750 (Mr. Reynolds) (“arguing that under the new 
constitution the legislature would “be confined almost entirely to the perfecting of the Codes”). 
 70.  See id. at 1040–41; 3 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 1406–07. 
 71.  See, e.g., 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 1062 (Mr. Howard) (“In the City of Los 
Angeles about half a dozen fellows, with an axe to grind, got up a charter and sent it up here [to the 
capitol] for ratification, unbeknown to the people of the city, and they got it adopted too.  It 
proceeded to organize a city government under the pretense of organizing a Board of Public 
Works.”). 
 72.  See, e.g., id. at 1060 (Mr. Wellin) (“What reason have these gentlemen to give why we 
should not manage our own affairs. . . .  Do you suppose that we are not intelligent enough—that we 
do not know our own wants?  Do you suppose we cannot send a delegation here to Sacramento that 
know their business?”); id. at 1062 (Mr. Joyce) (“Does he want to have the charter of San Francisco 
[subject to legislative approval] so the railroad company can rob us as they have for years past?”); 3 
SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 1406–07 (Mr. Barbour) (denouncing the idea of subjecting 
charters to ratification by the legislature as well as the people as “an abandonment of the whole 
principle of self-government”). 
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and passionate encomia to the virtues of local self-government.73  This party 
advocated for the Freehold Charter Clause, which originally did not provide 
for any legislative oversight.74  Another faction was suspicious of local 
governments, especially that of San Francisco.75  When this faction found 
that it did not have the support necessary to strike out the clause entirely, it 
attempted to limit the clause’s operation, subject it to legislative oversight, 
and make it less politically palatable.76  Despite such opposition, the clause 
became part of the final constitution.77  By subsequent amendments, it was 
restored more or less to the form of the original proposal.78 
D. The Municipal Affairs Amendment 
The spirit of the 1879 constitution and the home rule provisions was 
 
 73.  See, e.g., 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 1062 (Mr. Howard) (“Now, sir, this 
system of town government in the thirty States, and particularly in New England, has met the 
commendation of many eminent men, and particularly of De Tocqueville.  I know it is a good 
system of government.  I know it secures local rights, local economy, local good government.  I have 
heard, at town meetings in New England, discussions on public affairs relating to township 
government, that would have done honor either to the Legislature or the Congress of the United 
States.  And it is the proper place for this power to rest, with those who know the local interests, and 
who are thus able to provide for their own control.”). 
 74.  See id. at 1059–60. 
 75.  See, e.g., id. at 1062 (Mr. Freeman) (“[W]hen gentlemen here profess the faith which they 
do profess in local administration of government, they must have had a different experience from 
what I have read of . . . .  It may be that the local township governments of New England have 
operated as well as the gentleman says, but it is not true that in the great cities of the Union the 
system has operated well.”).; id. at 1061 (Mr. Hale) (decrying the clause as “the boldest kind of an 
attempt at secession”). 
 76.  The first major argument against the home rule provision was that it singled out San 
Francisco for special treatment.  See id. at 1062–63.  There is some evidence to suggest that the 
section had been sabotaged in committee with the intent of defeating it on the floor: the very 
delegates who were attacking the provision for being exclusive had actually pressed for that 
exclusivity in the committee on local government.  See id.  Mr. Hale and Mr. McCallum, who 
pressed the complaint that only San Francisco was eligible, were both members of the committee 
that drafted the section.  See id. at 1050. 
 77.  CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, § 8. 
 78.  In 1887, smaller cities succeeded in amending the constitution to reduce the population 
threshold to 10,000, and in 1890 that number was further reduced to 3500.  Amanda Meeker, Local 
Government: An Overview of the History of Constitutional Provisions Dealing with Local 
Government, in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, CONSTITUTION REVISION: 
HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE 90 (1996).  The requirement of legislative approval, however, was not 
removed until 1974—simply to reduce administrative costs (no charter had ever been rejected).  Id. 
at 91. 
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clear to the supreme court from the beginning: “[i]t was manifestly the 
intention of . . . the [home rule provisions], to emancipate municipal 
governments from the authority and control formerly exercised over them by 
the Legislature.”79  The achievement of that goal was stalled, however, by 
the clauses stating that charter cities remained subject to all “general laws.”80  
In the case of Thomason v. Ashworth,81 the court reasoned that this language 
permitted “the legislature . . . to control the charters of all corporations by 
general laws,” meaning that it could regulate cities as a class.82  Despite 
acknowledging the implication of this ruling—that city charters were subject 
to any revision by the legislature so long as the revision applied to all cities 
of a class—the court maintained that the constitution allowed the legislature 
that power.83  In later cases, the court held that a state law providing for 
police courts displaced similar courts organized under city charters.84  The 
dissenters in Ashworth and the police court cases argued that the court’s 
interpretation would frustrate the entire intent of the new constitution with 
regard to city charters.85  The majority, however, was unwavering, and the 
rules of Ashworth and Henshaw were ultimately undone not by judicial 
construction but by constitutional amendment. 
In 1896, the people of California amended the Freehold Charter Clause 
 
 79.  People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880). 
 80.  CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, § 8 (providing that charters are to be “subject to the 
Constitution and laws of [California]” and supersede only “special laws”); id. art. XI, § 6 (providing 
that all charters are to be “subject to and controlled by general laws.”). 
 81.  73 Cal. 73, 75–76 (1887) (upholding the application against a charter city of a statute 
governing “the improvement of streets, lanes, alleys, courts, places, and sidewalks, and the 
construction of sewers within municipalities”). 
 82.  Id. at 76–78 (reasoning that such a rule was in keeping with the spirit of the home rule 
provisions, which was “the inhibition of special or local legislation, and the allowance of general 
legislation”). 
 83.  See id. at 78–79 (“The evils of general legislation are such as spring from the imperfection 
of all things human and the abuse of power; but the abuse, or liability to abuse, affords no argument 
against the existence of such power.”). 
 84.  See, e.g., Ex parte Ah You, 82 Cal. 339 (1890); People ex rel Daniels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 
436 (1888). 
 85.  See, e.g., Ashworth, 73 Cal. at 87 (McKinstry, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s 
holding would allow that a charter “adopted for San Francisco by San Francisco, can be amended 
out of existence by statutes passed in the legislature by a majority composed in no part of members 
representing San Francisco”); Henshaw, 76 Cal. at 454 (McKinstry, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
police court law had “altered, in a matter of most material concern, the city government[s]” 
operating under freehold charters); In re Ah You, 82 Cal. 339, 344 (1890) (Fox, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that charters were “made by the constitution itself . . . inviolable at the hands of the 
legislature”). 
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to provide that charters would not be subject to general laws concerning 
“municipal affairs”—the origin of the current Municipal Affairs Clause.86  
The Court’s earliest holdings under the clause were narrow.87  But a more 
comprehensive theory of the clause was finally required in Fragley v. 
Phelan, which considered a statute regulating election procedures for the 
ratification of freehold charters.88  The court was unanimous in upholding 
the statute’s application to charter cities but issued three separate opinions 
that expressed three different views of the Municipal Affairs Clause.89  
Justice Garoutte reasoned that municipal affairs were those matters which 
pertained solely to the internal affairs of the city.90  This interpretation of the 
clause was very broad, encompassing all the internal affairs of a city, but 
those internal affairs did not include the ratification of a charter.91  Justice 
Harrison believed that charter elections could in principal be a municipal 
affair but disposed of the case on the narrow ground that the San Francisco 
charter did not contain governing provisions on the subject.92  Harrison 
seemed to allow that the exercise of any power granted to a city in its charter 
was a municipal affair.93  Justice Temple, writing for himself alone, argued 
that the purpose of the municipal affairs amendment was clear: the people 
meant to undo the holdings of Ashworth and Henshaw.94  Despite his 
 
 86.  See Meeker, supra note 78, at 90. 
 87.  See, e.g., Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 460 (1899) (holding that the salary of police 
and firemen was clearly a municipal affair, but providing no construction of the clause); People ex 
rel. Cuff v. City of Oakland, 123 Cal. 598, 603–04 (1899) (holding unanimously that the procedure 
for annexing new territory could not be a municipal affair—a contrary rule being absurd, because it 
would give a city the power to expand its own power). 
 88.  126 Cal. 383, 385 (1899). 
 89.  See id. (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 391 (Harrison, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 
400 (Temple, J., concurring). 
 90.  See id. at 387 (arguing that the purpose of the amendment was to “prevent existing 
provisions of charters from being frittered away by general laws” and to “enable municipalities to 
conduct their own business and control their own affairs, to the fullest possible extent, in their own 
way”). 
 91.  See id. at 387–89 (citing People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 111 (1871) (Cooley, 
J., concurring)). 
 92.  Fragley, 126 Cal. at 395–96 (Harrison, J., concurring) (arguing that the crucial limitation on 
a city’s power is that it can only do what is authorized by its charter).  In a later case, Justice Temple 
also affirmed this principle.  See Fritz v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 132 Cal. 373, 380–81 (1901) (Temple, 
J., concurring). 
 93.  See Fragley, 126 Cal. at 395 (Harrison, J., concurring).  
 94.  See id. at 400–01 (Temple, J., concurring).  He disagreed with Justice Garoutte in that he 
believed charter elections to be a municipal affair and disagreed with Justice Harrison in that he 
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conclusion that the election was a municipal affair governed by the city’s 
charter, he concurred in the application of the statute based upon the 
legislature’s acceptance of the charter ratified in the election, arguing that 
the very fact the legislature had passed the charter into law was “conclusive 
evidence that it made the proper investigation and found the requisite facts 
which would warrant its action”—that is, that it was the charter framed by 
the city for its own government.95  None of these opinions was joined by a 
majority of the court.96 
Despite this lively debate between three well-reasoned views, the most 
important early case attempting to construe the Municipal Affairs Clause 
was Ex parte Braun.97  Braun dealt with the issue of whether a charter city 
could levy a license tax against sellers of liquor for the purpose of raising 
revenue rather than protecting the public health, safety, and welfare.98  
Rather than describe and resolve the split represented by Fragley, the 
majority vaguely asserted that the wording of the clause was “broad enough 
to include all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess, and actually 
conferred upon it by the sovereign power.”99  Justice McFarland 
begrudgingly concurred in the judgment, insinuating that the amendment 
was the result of democratic excess and complaining that it “uses the loose, 
undefinable, wild words ‘municipal affairs,’ and imposes upon the courts the 
almost impossible duty of saying what they mean.”100  McFarland despaired 
of ever establishing a general definition and believed that subsequent cases 
would be decided on their own facts in an unprincipled fashion.101  Chief 
 
interpreted the San Francisco charter to address the issue.  Id. at 400. 
 95.  See id. at 403. 
 96.  See id. at 385 (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 391 (Harrison, J.) (plurality opinion); 
id. at 400 (Temple, J., concurring). 
 97.  141 Cal. 204 (1903).  Braun case is critically important because of its subsequent acceptance 
and development in Federal Savings.  See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 
1, 12 (1991). 
 98.  See 141 Cal. at 205–07 (finding that the charter of Los Angeles did provide it with the power 
to raise revenue by way of license taxes, which conflicted with a statute providing that cities and 
counties could only levy license taxes under the police power). 
 99.  Braun, 141 Cal. at 209 (holding that license taxes for revenue purposes were obviously an 
appropriate power for a municipality to possess and thus a municipal affair).  See id. 
 100.  Id. at 213–14 (McFarland, J., concurring) (“It is difficult to realize that the people of the 
state, through their Legislature, have no longer the power to say that a license tax—a tax upon the 
right to do business, a tax upon capacity—is unjust, unequal, and oppressive, and should not be 
tolerated anywhere within the state; but we think that such is now the law.”). 
 101.  See id. 
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Justice Beatty dissented, arguing that the “sole purpose” of the Municipal 
Affairs Clause was to overrule the Ashworth line of cases.102  The 
amendment was not intended to exempt charter cities from laws which 
applied to all the people of the state, and Beatty would have upheld the 
statute as a general law.103 
Subsequent cases did not provide a single, coherent view of the 
Municipal Affairs Clause in which the court as a whole concurred.104  As the 
law developed, the necessity of all powers being laid out in the city’s charter 
gave rise to “bulky and sometimes complicated charter[s]” and frequent 
amendments.105  To mitigate this problem, Professor William Jones 
recommended an amendment to the constitution to rephrase the Municipal 
Affairs Clause as an affirmative grant of local power rather than a limitation 
on state power.106  That amendment was adopted by the people in 1914,107 
and courts have subsequently held that charter cities receive, by default, the 
entire power available under the constitution over municipal affairs and 
charters now serve as documents of limitation.108  The modern court’s 
interpretation of the municipal affairs doctrine, while it draws on the 
language of these early cases, represents a substantial departure from their 
principles. 
III. THE MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS CLAUSE 
A. The Growth of the Statewide Concern Doctrine 
After Braun, the municipal affairs authority of charter cities gradually 
became subject to “certain limitations of indefinite dimensions.”109  The key 
limitation was that if a statute “affect[ed] a municipal affair only incidentally 
in the accomplishment of a proper objective of state-wide concern” it would 
 
 102.  See id. at 215–16 (Beatty, C.J., dissenting). 
 103.  See id. at 217–19. 
 104.  See ARVO VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, 
BACKGROUND STUDY RELATING TO ARTICLE XI: LOCAL GOVERNMENT 238 (1966).  
 105.  William Cary Jones, “Municipal Affairs” in the California Constitution, 1 CAL. L. REV. 132, 
145 (1912). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Meeker, supra note 78, at 90. 
 108.  See, e.g., W. Coast Adver. Co. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 14 Cal. 2d 516 (1939). 
 109.  VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 104, at 237. 
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preempt a charter provision.110  The courts initially used the phrase “matter 
of statewide concern” as the opposite of the term “municipal affair.”111  But 
later the court held that an issue might be a municipal affair in the general 
sense yet not “exclusively of municipal concern” and thus “not a municipal 
affair within the meaning of . . . the Constitution.”112  When the Constitution 
Revision Commission evaluated the local government provisions in the 
1960s, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne suggested that such cases continued to 
be decided in “pragmatic, policy-oriented” ways and that the doctrine should 
be “recognized for what it is—an effort by the court in a particular case to 
allocate the governmental powers under consideration in the most sensible 
and appropriate fashion.”113 
B. The Federal Savings Analysis 
Eventually, in California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. City 
of Los Angeles, the court took Professor Van Alstyne’s suggestion.114  In 
Federal Savings, the City of Los Angeles sought to apply its annual business 
license tax to the California Federal Savings and Loan Association despite a 
statute in the California Revenue Code declaring the state income tax on 
such corporations exclusive of all other taxes, including license taxes levied 
by charter cities.115  The court held that, while the tax did concern a 
municipal affair, “aspects of local taxation may under some circumstances 
 
 110.  Wilson v. Walters, 19 Cal. 2d 111, 119 (1941) (citing Dep’t of Water & Power of L.A. v. 
Inyo Chem. Co., 16 Cal. 2d 744, 753−54 (1940)).  This limitation purports to derive from Pasadena 
v. Charleville.  See Inyo Chem., 16 Cal. 2d at 753–54 (citing City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 
Cal. 384 (1932)). 
 111.  See, e.g., Douglass v. City of L.A., 5 Cal. 2d 123, 128 (1935) (holding that the safety of 
public roads is a matter of statewide concern); Charleville, 215 Cal. at 398 (1932) (holding that the 
employment of aliens on public works is a matter of statewide concern); Sandstoe v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe  Ry. Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 215, 221 (1938) (holding that the tort liability of local 
public agencies is a matter of statewide concern); Armas v. City of Oakland, 135 Cal. App. 411, 421 
(1933) (holding that the “organization, operation, and control of municipal fire and police 
departments” is a municipal affair). 
 112.  L.A. Ry. Corp. v. City of L.A., 16 Cal. 2d 779, 783 (1940) (emphasis added); see also In re 
Hubbard, 62 Cal.2d 119 (1964), overruled in part by Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56 (1969).   
 113.  VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 104, at 239, 241. 
 114.  See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 17 (1991) (citing VAN 
ALSTYNE, supra note 104, at 239). 
 115.  See Federal Savings, 54 Cal. 3d at 6.  The analogy with Braun is clear: in both cases a 
statute purported to immunize individuals against some forms of local taxation.  Compare id., with 
Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 205–06 (1903). 
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acquire a ‘supramunicipal’ dimension, transforming an otherwise intramural 
affair into a matter of statewide concern warranting legislative attention.”116  
Noting the extensive regulatory regime governing savings and loan 
associations, the legislature’s purpose in passing the law, and the history of 
Los Angeles’ license tax, the court reaffirmed its decision in Braun that local 
taxation was unquestionably a municipal affair.117  Despite this 
characterization, the court held that a matter so crucial to the statewide 
economy could be subject to legislative control despite being a municipal 
affair.118  The case law on the Municipal Affairs Clause had, in the court’s 
view, come to embody a “dialectical” approach that resisted the categorical 
separation of government into municipal affairs and statewide concerns.119  
The court stated that in Municipal Affairs Clause cases it’s role is to balance 
the city’s interests and those of the state on a case by case basis.120  But this 
procedure, though characterized by a “sometimes mercurial discretion” is to 
be constrained by a “decisional procedure” with three essential steps: (1) 
determine that a subject constitutes a “municipal affair”; (2) determine the 
existence of an actual conflict between the state law and the charter city law, 
and; (3) determine whether the state law at issue is necessary to address a 
matter of statewide concern.121 
IV. THE PREVAILING WAGE LAW AND TRADES COUNCIL 
A. Legal Background 
The California Labor Code requires that all public works contracts 
provide for the payment of the local prevailing wage.122  Wage support 
 
 116.  Federal Savings, 54 Cal. 3d at 7. 
 117.  See id. at 7–12 (discussing 1979 Cal. Stat. 4220). 
 118.  Id. at 12–13 (distinguishing Braun as “only one side of the coin” and holding that the court 
must sometimes choose between conflicting state and local laws which “both stem from concerns 
rooted in their respective spheres of government”). 
 119.  Id. at 13.  The court did not overrule Braun, because the statewide concern analysis was an 
addition to the case law which came after Braun and made the two cases distinguishable.  See id. at 
14. 
 120.  See id. at 15–16. 
 121.  Id. at 15–18 (stating that a thing which constitutes a matter of statewide concern ceases, “pro 
tanto,” to be a municipal affair, and that these two phrases “represent, Janus-like, ultimate legal 
conclusions rather than factual descriptions”). 
 122.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1771 (West 2013) (“Except for public works projects of one thousand 
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programs for employees working on public works projects have been a part 
of California law since at least 1897,123 but the legislature first adopted a 
modern prevailing wage law, known as the Public Wage Rate Act, during 
the Great Depression.124  Shortly after the statute was passed, the court held 
in City of Pasadena v. Charleville that it could not be applied to charter city 
when it contracted to improve a city-owned, city-operated facility using only 
the city’s money.125  Because the wage rate on such projects was a municipal 
affair, the court reasoned that the state law could not control, creating a case-
specific exemption for charter cities.126  Decades after Charleville was 
decided, however, a split of authority developed in the court of appeal, and 
that holding was called into question.127 
 
dollars ($1,000) or less, not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a 
similar character in the locality in which the public work is performed, and not less than the general 
prevailing rate of per diem wages for holiday and overtime work fixed as provided in this chapter, 
shall be paid to all workers employed on public works.”).  The law also provides minimum standards 
for the employment of apprentices, LAB. § 1777.5(d), and procedures for determining the prevailing 
wage and administering the law, §§ 1770–1781. 
 123.  See 1897 Cal. Stat. 90 (setting the minimum wage per diem at $2). 
 124.  See 1931 Cal. Stat. 910.  In the same year, Congress passed the Davis-Bacon Act, the federal 
prevailing wage law.  Pub. L. No. 71-798, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. 
§§ 3141–3148 (2012).  The original law was incorporated into the Labor Code when it was created, 
see 1937 Cal. Stat. 241–46, and was subsequently amended to assign the determination of the 
prevailing wage to the Department of Industrial Relations rather than the public agency awarding the 
contract, see 1976 Cal. Stat. 587. 
 125.  215 Cal. 384, 389–392 (1932), overruled in part by Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 
566 (1969). 
 126.  See id. at 393.  The court emphasized the oppositional nature of the categories, noting that 
no previous case had found state law controlling against a charter provision without finding that the 
provision did not concern municipal affairs.  See id. (citing Esberg v. Badaracco, 202 Cal. 110, 116 
(1927) (school taxes); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 641 (1920) (speed limits)). 
 127.  Compare Vial v. City of San Diego, 122 Cal. App. 3d 346, 348 (1981) (upholding a local 
resolution that conflicted with the prevailing wage law where the resolution “exclude[d] state and 
federally funded projects and those ‘considered to be of State concern’”), with Div. of Labor 
Standards Enforcement v. Ericsson Info. Sys., Inc., 221 Cal. App. 3d 114, 123–24 (1990) (applying 
the prevailing wage law to the University of California, which possess analogous home rule powers, 
under the theory that it addressed a matter of statewide concern).  The court in Ericsson argued that 
Vial was distinguishable because of the indiscriminate nature of the University’s policy compared 
with that of San Diego.  See id. at 124.  A highly regarded practice guide, however, regarded the 
application of the prevailing wage law to charter cities as “in a state of flux” after these decisions.  
See LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, THE CALIFORNIA MUNICIPAL LAW HANDBOOK §§ 7.84 (2011).  
The supreme court itself acknowledged, by reserving the issue, that the continued application of the 
municipal affairs doctrine to the prevailing wage law was an open question.  See City of Long Beach 
v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 34 Cal. 4th 942, 947 (2004). 
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B. Facts and Procedural Background 
The people of Vista, a mid-sized city in San Diego County, approved a 
0.5% sales tax increase for the purpose of constructing and renovating a 
number of public buildings.128  In order to reduce costs associated with these 
projects, the city—on the advice of the city attorney—took steps to become 
a charter city, planning to avoid the payment of prevailing wages.129  The 
charter was ratified by the people and the city passed an ordinance providing 
that no city contract would require the payment of the prevailing wage 
unless: (1) the terms of a state or federal grant required it, (2) the contract 
did not involve a municipal affair, or (3) the city council separately 
authorized the payment of the prevailing wage.130  The city then entered into 
several construction contracts that did not comply with the state’s prevailing 
wage act.131  The State Building and Construction Trades Council, a large 
construction industry union, sought to compel compliance with the act by 
writ of mandate.132  In support of its argument for the application of the law 
to charter cities, the union submitted a declaration by its president “asserting 
the regional nature of the construction industry and describing 
apprenticeship training in that industry.”133  The trial court denied the writ.134  
The court of appeal affirmed in a divided decision, and the union appealed to 
the supreme court.135 
C. Holdings and Dissents 
1. The Nature of the Analysis 
The court held that the city charter provision superseded the state law 
with regard to the contracts at issue, applying the Federal Savings analysis, 
the general terms of which the dissenters did not object to: 
 
 128.  State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal., AFL-CIO v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 
552 (2012). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See id. at 553. 
 131.  See id. 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  See id. at 554.  
 135.  See id. 
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First, a court must determine whether the city ordinance at issue 
regulates an activity that can be characterized as a ‘municipal 
affair.’  Second, the court ‘must satisfy itself that the case presents 
an actual conflict between [local and state law].’  Third, the court 
must decide whether the state law addresses a matter of ‘statewide 
concern.’  Finally, the court must determine whether the law is 
‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of that concern and ‘narrowly 
tailored’ to avoid unnecessary interference in local governance.  ‘If . 
. . the court is persuaded that the subject of the state statute is one of 
statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably related to its 
resolution [and not unduly broad in its sweep], then the conflicting 
charter city measure ceases to be a “municipal affair” pro 
tanto . . . .’136 
The opinions of the court, however, reflected a conflict about the nature of 
this analysis.  The majority emphasized that the analysis is a question of law, 
finding that the court of appeal erred in emphasizing the factual record and 
the Union’s failure to prove the statewide economic impact of the prevailing 
wage law.137  Justice Liu, in dissent, criticized the majority for emphasizing 
this point so strongly, sarcastically noting that despite its insistence that the 
issue is a matter of law, “no clear legal principle emerges” from the majority 
opinion.138  The court also divided concerning the factors used to weigh state 
and local interests.  The majority found that the economic argument for a 
statewide response was unpersuasive given that the law only applied to 
public agencies and was not a general minimum wage law of the kind the 
legislature could rightly enact.139  Justice Liu objected to this argument, 
arguing that while a law of more general application would have an even 
 
 136.  See id. at 556 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see id. at 566, 567 (Werdegar, J., 
dissenting); id. at 579–80 (Liu, J., dissenting).  The court cited Federal Savings for the proposition 
that state laws must be narrowly tailored to meet the statewide concerns implicated, but Federal 
Savings itself does not actually say it is a requirement.  See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of 
L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 24 (1991).  However, shortly after the decision in Federal Savings, the court 
construed Federal Savings as requiring narrow tailoring.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th 
389, 403 (1992). 
 137.  See Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 555–58 (insisting that, despite the relevance of history, 
the question always remains how the state constitution allocates power between the state and the 
charter city). 
 138.  Id. at 579 (Liu, J., dissenting).  Liu accused the majority of employing the distinction 
cynically to minimize the statewide concern.  See id. at 583. 
 139.  See id. at 564–65 (majority opinion). 
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better claim to touching a matter of statewide concern the legislature should 
not be precluded from using market mechanisms to achieve its goal by 
leveraging “the substantial role that public works projects play” in the 
market.140  The majority also distinguished between procedural requirements 
and substantive requirements—the latter of which, being more intrusive, 
would less likely be found to be a matter of statewide concern.141  Because 
the prevailing wage law governed the substance rather than the procedure of 
public works contracts, it was more suspect under this rule.142  Justice Liu 
disagreed with this assessment of the relevant precedent, arguing that while 
procedural regulation was subject to more permissive scrutiny it could not 
therefore be concluded that substantive regulation received especially strict 
scrutiny.143  The majority also rejected the argument that, while charter cities 
had plenary authority to determine the wages of their public employees, the 
wages paid by their private contractors were a matter of statewide concern, 
finding that the distinction was “irrelevant.”144  Justice Werdegar objected 
that the distinction was deeply relevant, because the contractor’s employees 
are not even city employees and thus are very far removed from core 
municipal affairs.145  These differences in analysis reflect different 
understandings of the logic of the Federal Savings rule and illustrate the 
need for a more coherent standard. 
 
 140.  Id. at 588–89 (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 141.  See id. at 563–64 (majority opinion). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See id. at 589 (Liu, J., dissenting) (citing People v. City of Seal Beach, 36 Cal.3d 591, 601 
(1984)). 
 144.  Id. at 564 (majority opinion) (dismissing the argument because the Union’s economic 
rationale would apply whether the employees were public or private).  Justice Werdegar argued that 
precedent demanded greater leniency in finding a statewide concern when the issue was fair labor 
standards.  See id. at 572–73 (citing Seal Beach, 36 Cal. 3d at 599 (upholding a meet and confer 
requirement applied to city police departments); Prof’l Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of L.A., 60 Cal. 2d 
276, 294−95 (1963) (upholding a labor relations law applied to city fire departments)).  She argued 
broadly that the state constitution gave the legislature “specific constitutional authority to address 
labor issues on a statewide scale.”  Id. at 571–73 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (2013) (“The 
Legislature may provide for minimum wages and for the general welfare of employees and for those 
purposes may confer on a commission legislative, executive, and judicial powers.”)). 
 145.  See id. at 572–73, 576–77 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (citing Seal Beach, 36 Cal.3d at 591 
(upholding a meet and confer requirement applied to city police departments); Prof'l Fire Fighters, 
Inc. v. City of L.A., 60 Cal.2d 276 (1963) (upholding a labor relations law applied to city fire 
departments)) (arguing that precedent demanded greater leniency in finding a statewide concern 
when the issue was fair labor standards). 
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2. The Precedential Value of City of Pasadena v. Charleville 
In determining that the wage rates in the contracts were municipal 
affairs, the court relied on the authority of City of Pasadena v. Charleville.146  
The court emphasized two specific features the Vista ordinance shared with 
the ordinance in Charleville: it concerned only city facilities and excluded 
contracts that received state or federal funding or were otherwise matters of 
statewide concern.147  The dissent argued that Charleville should be 
overruled and that its legal and factual bases had been eroded by time.148  
Both Justices Werdegar and Liu interpreted Charleville as relying on the 
theory of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.149  That case, and by extension 
Charleville, represented to the dissent “a thoroughly discredited conception 
of constitutional limitations on economic legislation.”150 
This argument contains two fundamental mistakes: the failure to 
recognize that the citation of Adkins in Charleville was dicta, and a 
misapprehension of the issue in Trades Council.  In Charleville, the court 
cited Adkins for the proposition that a prevailing wage law of general 
application would present “constitutional questions,” explaining why the 
legislature applied the law only to public works projects.151  But the reason 
why the legislature wrote the law in that way was irrelevant to the holding 
and rationale of the case.  The Charleville court made its decision solely on 
the basis that the wages paid on public works constituted a “municipal 
affair.”152  Furthermore, the law at issue in Trades Council was not a 
minimum wage law, which the state has specific constitutional authority to 
enact.153  It governs only the wages to be required by public agencies through 
 
 146.  City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384 (1932); see id. at 558–59 (majority opinion).   
 147.  See id. at 559–61 (rejecting the argument that the increased integration of regional 
economies in the decades since Charleville had made the subject a matter of a statewide concern and 
Charleville should be abandoned). 
 148.  See id. at 570–71 (Werdegar, J., dissenting); id. at 586 (Liu, J., dissenting).  They contended 
that the logic of that case “has been overtaken by history” and it should be “consign[ed] . . . to the 
dustbin.”  Id. at 570–71 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 149.  261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937) (cited in City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 390 (1932)). 
 150.  Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 586 (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 151.  215 Cal. at 390. 
 152.  Id. at 389.  Charleville applied the California Constitution’s Municipal Affairs Clause, 
unlike Adkins—which was an interpretation of the Federal Due Process Clause.  See Adkins, 261 
U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 153.  See CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (2013).  Justice Werdegar gamely argued that this clause 
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their contracting process.154  Such legislation is not within the state’s 
constitutional power, however laudable its intention, and Adkins has nothing 
to do with that conclusion.  However, the use of Charleville obviated the 
need for the court to determine whether wages paid under public works 
contracts constituted a municipal affair.  Therefore, the court only discussed 
whether a statewide concern existed sufficient to allow state regulation in 
spite of that conclusion.155  But this analysis, described in terms of balancing 
between competing interests, obscures the true purpose of the municipal 
affairs doctrine.  While the court characterized the state interest as merely 
abstract, the true rationale was that city funds should be used as the city 
pleases: 
[T]he question presented is whether the state can require a charter 
city to exercise its purchasing power in the construction market in a 
way that supports regional wages and subsidizes vocational training, 
while increasing the charter city’s costs.  No one would doubt that 
the state could use its own resources to support wages and 
vocational training in the state’s construction industry, but can the 
state achieve these ends by interfering in the fiscal policies of 
charter cities?  Autonomy with regard to the expenditure of public 
funds lies at the heart of what it means to be an independent 
governmental entity.156 
This argument has merit, but the court should provide a general construction 
of the clause that relies on such arguments rather than an unguided balancing 
of interests. 
 
grants the legislature “specific constitutional authority to address labor issues on a statewide scale.”  
Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 573 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).  This argument is unavailing, because 
the state did not address the issue on a statewide scale, but by commandeering the purchasing power 
of local public agencies.  See id. at 564–65 (majority opinion). 
 154.  See Trades Council. 54 Cal. 4th at 564–65.  Justice Liu admitted in his dissent that the 
legislature chose not to regulate under a general law but to use the purchasing power and market 
impact of state and local public agencies to effect its policy goal.  Id. at 588–89 (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 155.  Id. at 556 (majority opinion). 
 156.  Id. at 561–62 (majority opinion) (citing Johnson v. Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 407 (1992) (“‘[W]e 
can think of nothing that is of greater municipal concern than how a city’s tax dollars will be spent; 
nor anything which could be of less interest to taxpayers of other jurisdictions.’”)). 
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3. The Role of Legislative Findings 
The most contentious issue in Trades Council was the degree of 
deference courts should give to a legislative finding that a subject constitutes 
a “matter of statewide concern.”157  The court acknowledged that the 
legislature had determined public works wage rates to be a statewide 
concern,158 but relied on a variety of cases to support the proposition that 
such a finding was not determinative.159  However, the court continued to 
acknowledge the rule that it must accord “great weight” to such a 
determination by the legislature.160  The dissenting justices differed with the 
majority about the degree of deference the legislature should be given, and 
would have upheld the law on the theory that the case was close and that 
doubts must be resolved in favor of the legislature because of the severity of 
a constitutional ruling.161  The majority did not question the principle of 
deference itself; it only limited its deference on the principle that courts 
should be “‘especially’ hesitant” to defer to the legislature “‘when . . . the 
issue involves the division of power between local government and that 
same Legislature.’”162  Clearly, such hesitation is well justified.  But in light 
of the fact that all cases under the Municipal Affairs Clause concern the 
division of power between local government and the legislature, what 
justification remains for any deference at all? 
These ambiguities demonstrate the need for a settled rule that may be 
consistently applied by courts without resort to inherently political 
judgments about which “interest” is less “abstract,” which necessarily 
becomes a judgment about which policy is more important—a political 
rather than a justiciable question.163 
 
 157.  See Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 561; id. at 566–67, 572 (Werdegar, J., dissenting); id. at 
582–83 (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 158.  See id. at 565 (citing 2003 Cal. Stat. 6247; 2002 Cal. Stat. 5541; 2002 Cal. Stat. 5455). 
 159.  See id.  
 160.  Id. (citing Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 136 (1982)). 
 161.  See id. at 578 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“[D]oubt . . . must be resolved in favor of the 
legislative authority of the state.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 579 (Liu, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he court moves incautiously in an area where it becomes us to exercise more than the usual 
caution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 162.  Id. at 565 (majority opinion) (quoting Cnty. of Riverside v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 4th 278, 
286 (2003)). 
 163.  Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 23–24 (1991) 
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V. THE CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF A SETTLED RULE 
The court has approvingly cited Justice McFarland’s exasperated 
complaint that the constitution “uses the loose, indefinable, wild words, 
‘municipal affairs,’ and imposes upon the courts the almost impossible duty 
of saying what they mean.”164  Indeed, the court seems to have completely 
abandoned the attempt to articulate a principled definition of “municipal 
affairs.”165  This cannot stand.  In light of the judiciary’s function within our 
system of government, the court should adopt a settled rule for the 
application of the Municipal Affairs Clause.  That rule should be faithful to 
the text and the structure of the state constitution and grounded in the history 
and political theory of the clause. 
A. Legislative Findings and the Role of the Courts 
The majority in Trades Council, while accepting that the court should 
give “great weight” to legislative findings of a statewide concern, insisted 
that such deference was limited and that the court remained the final arbiter 
of the issue.166  Even this falls short of the court’s constitutional duty.  The 
history of constitutional home rule makes clear that the primary motivation 
for dividing the state’s sovereignty was distrust of the legislature.167  And 
while the legislature represents the will of the people of California, the 
constitution does as well.168  While “[i]t is not a light thing to set aside an act 
of the legislature,”169 the court has a duty to uphold the constitution.170  The 
 
 164.  Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 214 (1903) (McFarland, J. concurring) (quoted in Cal. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal.3d 1, 15–16 (1991)). 
 165.  See, e.g., Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 558–59 (relying solely on precedent to determine 
that wage rates in public works contracts are a municipal affair without articulating any standard 
other than the Federal Savings analysis for making that determination in cases of first impression). 
 166.  54 Cal. 4th at 558. 
 167.  See supra notes 60–78 and accompanying text. 
 168.  Even more direct expressions of the people’s will—such as ballot initiatives—are subject to 
constitutional scrutiny because “the people have made statutes . . . subordinate to the Constitution, 
and have empowered the courts of this state in the exercise of the judicial power to interpret the 
state’s fundamental charter.”  People’s Advocate v. Superior Court (California Legislature), 181 Cal. 
App. 3d 316, 322 (1986). 
 169.  Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 390 (1899). 
 170.  See People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 25−26 (1875) (“The courts cannot shirk the responsibility 
of deciding such questions, when presented.  It is as much their duty to consider the Constitution, in 
ascertaining what is the law, as to consider the statute.  This duty must be performed, whatever the 
consequences.  The judicial department is the proper power in the Government to determine whether 
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court, under the constitution, has “ample power” to police the use of 
legislative authority and “preserve the core meaning of municipal home 
rule,” and it is obliged to do so.171  The court should clearly affirm that the 
legislature has no place in determining the extent of its own constitutional 
power and adopt a clear, readily applicable construction of the Municipal 
Affairs Clause.  The formulation of that construction must begin with the 
text. 
B. The Text of the Clause: “All” Means “All” 
Legal interpretation begins with the text of the instrument to be 
construed.172  The term “municipal affairs” is “notoriously ambiguous”,173 
but even an ambiguous phrase must be given a meaning which the that will 
bear.174  This precludes the court’s understanding—finally articulated in 
Federal Savings but nascent in the cases following Braun—that a subject 
may constitute a municipal affair but still be subject to state preemption if it 
also constitutes a matter of statewide concern.175  This simply cannot be the 
meaning of the text, because the text clearly states that with respect to 
municipal affairs, charter provisions “shall supersede all laws inconsistent 
therewith.”176  At the time the clause was added, the word “municipal,” as a 
legal term of art, denoted simply “that which belongs to a corporation or a 
city . . . includ[ing] the rules or laws by which a particular district, 
community, or nation is governed.”177  The word “affairs” is a word of much 
“wide[r] import,” and is even broader than simply “business.”178  This text 
will bear a number of different meanings.  It could bear a meaning as narrow 
as a municipal version of the corporate internal affairs doctrine.179  It could 
also bear a meaning as broad as “all powers appropriate for a municipality to 
 
a statute be or be not constitutional.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 171.  Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 15 (1991). 
 172.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 16. 
 173.  Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 28, at 1344. 
 174.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 31 (“A fundamental rule of textual interpretation is 
that neither a word nor a sentence may be given a meaning that it cannot bear.”). 
 175.  See supra notes 111–21 and accompanying text. 
 176.  CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(a) (2013) (emphasis added).  It does not say “all laws inconsistent 
therewith which do not reach matters of statewide concern.”  
 177.  HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A LAW DICTIONARY 798 (1910). 
 178.  Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 394–95 (1899) (Harrison, J., concurring). 
 179.  See id. at 385 (plurality opinion) 
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possess and actually conferred upon it by the sovereign power.”180  But 
grammar itself forbids construing “all laws inconsistent therewith”181 to 
mean all laws not touching matters of statewide concern. 
But the term “municipal affairs” predates the 1896 amendment adding 
the clause to the constitution, and its use in case law is instructive.182  In 
1871, when California still applied Dillon’s Rule, the court used the phrase 
to describe the range of purposes for which the legislature may use city 
funds.183  In 1875, when the court held there was a right to local self-
government, it used the term similarly, equating it with “matters of purely 
local concern.”184  After the passage of the 1879 Constitution, the term 
continued to be used.185  It was used in one case to mean anything pertaining 
to the corporate structure or governance of the city.186  Whatever may be 
concluded from these instances, this much is clear: the term is, as Justice 
Harrison wrote, one of “wide import” and seems to embrace nearly 
everything a city does that is of public importance.187  But the early case law 
definitions are not the only—or even the best—resources available to the 
court. 
 
 180.  Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209 (1903) 
 181.  CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(a) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 182.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, §54, at 322 (“If a statute uses words or phrases that 
have already received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction’s court of last resort . . . they are 
to be understood according to that construction.”).  After the passage of the municipal affairs 
amendment, the court appealed to Sinton, an 1871 case, as authority for the proposition that the 
opening of streets was a municipal affair under the meaning of the clause.  See Byrne v. Drain, 127 
Cal. 663, 667 (1900) (citing Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525 (1871)).  This citation suggests that the 
court recognized the case law usage of the phrase prior to the amendment as a legitimate source of 
interpretive guidance.  See id. 
 183.  See Sinton, 41 Cal. at 530 (1871) (Crockett, J.) (“I am not aware that any case has gone so 
far as to hold that the Legislature may devote the funds of a municipal corporation to purposes 
confessedly private and having no relation to municipal affairs.”). 
 184.  People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 31 (1875). 
 185.  See People ex rel. Daniels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 448 (1888) (McKinstry, J., dissenting) 
(citing an unpublished superior court opinion describing a law as “‘distinctly municipal in character, 
spending its whole force upon the government, civil and criminal, of the city of Oakland and the 
regulation of its internal municipal affairs.’”).  See also Dunn v. Long Beach Land & Water Co., 114 
Cal. 605, 610 (1896); Woodward v. Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 99 Cal. 554, 562 (1893). 
 186.  See Henshaw, 76 Cal. at 448–50 (McKinstry, J., dissenting). 
 187.  Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 394–95 (Harrison, J., concurring). 
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C. The Purpose of the Clause: Local Laws and General Laws 
When constitutional text is not clear, the interpreter should have 
recourse to the structural purpose of the provision in question.188  The case 
law interpreting the amendment itself prior to Justice McFarland’s surrender 
of the interpretive enterprise in Ex parte Braun provides useful insights into 
the structural purpose of the amendment.189  After the amendment, the court 
clearly stated what it took to be the intent of the amendment: “[I]t had been 
believed by the legislature and by the people that it would be wiser to relieve 
charter cities from the operation of general laws affecting municipal affairs, 
lest otherwise there would be danger of the charter provisions being entirely 
‘frittered away.’”190  Among the early theories proposed concerning what the 
people intended when they passed the Municipal Affairs Clause, there was 
broad agreement that they intended to correct something that had gone 
wrong in the interpretation of the Constitution of 1879 itself.191  For that 
reason, the court continued to hold that the purpose of the “municipal 
affairs” language was to further restrict the legislature from interfering in 
matters that concern cities “under the guise of laws general in form.”192  In 
Fragley v. Phelan, the justices articulated two cogent constructions of the 
Municipal Affairs Clause based upon the political context and intent of the 
amendment—neither of which was discussed by Justice McFarland in Braun 
or the court in Federal Savings.193 
The first theory, advanced by Justices Garoutte and Harrison, was that 
the phrase is of “wide import” and encompasses all of the matters which are 
 
 188.  1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §405 
(“Where the words admit of two senses, each of which is conformable to common usage, that sense 
is to be adopted, which, without departing from the literal import of the words, best harmonizes with 
the nature and objects, the scope and design of the instrument.”). 
 189.  See supra notes 79–108 and accompanying text. 
 190.  Morton v. Broderick, 118 Cal. 474, 486–87 (1897) (internal citations omitted). 
 191.  Fragley, 126 Cal. at 387 (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion) (arguing that the people wished to 
protect charters from being “frittered away” by laws general in form but not in substance); id. at 395 
(Harrison, J., concurring) (arguing that municipal affairs included all things embraced in a charter, 
basically accepting Justice Garoutte’s view of the people’s purpose); id. at 400–01 (Temple, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the people intended to undo Ashworth and Henshaw, which had frustrated 
the original purpose of freehold charters). 
 192.  Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461 (1899). 
 193.  See Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383 (1899); Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204 (1903); Cal. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1 (1991). 
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committed to the city’s control.194  On this view, the municipal affairs of a 
city comprise all of the things provided for in its charter.195  This view is 
based on the notion that a charter is a negotiated settlement between the city 
and the state legislature, and that the legislature by approving the charter has 
“part[ed] with a portion of its sovereignty” and granted it to the city.196  This 
theory has some appeal because it is simple to apply: if a power is in the 
charter—a document that a court can read—it pertains to a municipal affair.  
However, whatever viability this theory once had was eliminated with 
subsequent amendments that rephrased the clause in terms of a general grant 
of power to cities rather than a limit on the legislature and removed the 
legislature from the ratification process.197  Because of the 1914 amendment, 
the text of city charters no longer provides greater interpretive guidance than 
the phrase “municipal affairs” itself.198  Additionally, the later amendments 
that removed the legislature from the process make it difficult to speak of the 
legislature as having “part[ed] with a portion of its sovereignty.”199 
The other view presented in Fragley is that of Justice Temple, who 
believed the people intended only to undo the holdings of Ashworth and 
Henshaw.200  This view is immediately attractive because it, like the modern 
case law, does not rely solely upon the words themselves, which “convey[] 
no definite meaning to [the] mind.”201  Instead, it provides a definite, 
ascertainable meaning for the clause based upon its context: “the author of 
the amendment had in mind the contention of the justices who dissented 
from the established doctrine.”202  The doctrine of those dissenters is clear 
from their opinions.203  It is rooted in the common law distinction between 
 
 194.  Fragley, 126 Cal. at 394–95 (Harrison, J). 
 195.  See id. at 395 (Harrison, J., concurring). 
 196.  Id. at 389 (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion); see id. at 395–96 (Harrison, J., concurring). 
 197.  See Meeker, supra note 78, at 91. 
 198.  See, e.g., Charter of the City of Vista §§ 100–101, 300 (specifically declaring the city 
exempt from public contracting statutes except as approved by the City Council and enumerating no 
other powers). 
 199.  Fragley, 126 Cal. at 389 (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 200.  See id. at 400–01 (Temple, J., concurring). 
 201.  Id. at 402; compare id., with Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal.3d 1, 16 
(1991). 
 202.  Fragley, 126 Cal. at 401 (Temple, J., concurring); cf. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 
(1890) (also reasoning that a constitutional amendment passed in reaction to a particular case should 
be construed in light of the dissenting opinions in that case).   
 203.  See id.  The primary dissenters from the doctrine of Ashworth were Justices McKinstry and 
Fox.  See Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 87 (1887) (McKinstry, J., dissenting); People ex rel. 
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general laws or general customs and local laws or particular customs—the 
former operating on “all persons and in all places” within the territory of the 
state and the latter applying only in particular places.204  According to Justice 
McKinstry, the entire structure of the constitution of 1879 was designed to 
favor local power on questions of local custom and law.205  Under this view, 
a state law may only be applied within a charter city if it is capable of being 
applied throughout the entire territory of the state, which would include laws 
relating to the general rights and duties of citizens, the administration of the 
courts, and all other laws that apply beyond as well as within the boundaries 
of cities.206  Furthermore, under this construction, the state is empowered to 
take action through general laws, but that action does not preclude municipal 
action through local laws pertaining to the very same matter, provided the 
two are not contradictory.207  While cases would arise under this rule 
requiring elaboration of the local–general distinction, such elaboration could 
be guided by reference to the political theory of the clause. 
D. The Theory of the Clause: Localism and Federalism 
In addition to being textually permissible and historically plausible, the 
court’s interpretation of the Municipal Affairs Clause should preserve the 
core political commitments of constitutional home rule.208  Previous 
scholarship has tended to see constitutional home rule as an innovation in 
state government rather than a foundational political principle like 
federalism.209  This common assumption, however, is not historically 
 
Daniels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 454 (1888) (McKinstry, J., dissenting); Ex parte Ah You, 82 Cal. 
339, 344 (1890) (Fox, J., dissenting); Davies v. City of L.A., 86 Cal. 37, 54 (1890) (Fox, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 204.  Davies, 86 Cal. at 54 (Fox, J., dissenting). 
 205.  Ashworth, 73 Cal. at 91–92. 
 206.  See id. at 92. 
 207.  See People ex rel. Lawlor v. Williamson, 135 Cal. 415, 416–20 (1902) (holding that a writ of 
quo warranto sought by the San Francisco board of public health, established by the legislature, 
would not issue against the new San Francisco board of public health, created by the city’s charter, 
and that insofar as the two boards did not have conflicting powers, the state and the city could both 
maintain boards of health). 
 208.  See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 15 (1991). 
 209.  Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 28, at 1342 (“[Judicially enforceable home rule] was 
extraordinary . . . in the further sense that courts would be acting to protect the autonomy of local 
governments that were historically understood to be mere creatures of the state government.  On 
these terms, imperium in imperio home rule was even more remarkable than constitutional 
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justified.  In fact, Dillon’s rule itself was an innovation, though its 
proponents asserted it as though it were the “historically understood” rule.210  
Federalism and home rule are, in fact, analogous.  The essence of federalism 
is that powers are divided between the state and national governments based 
not solely on the territory covered but also on the subjects that may be 
regulated.211  The system is fundamentally “anti-hierarchical, based on 
covenant[al] principles that see the proper political organization as a matrix 
with larger and smaller arenas but not higher and lower.”212  And it is 
eminently practical—power is made to reside where it will be needed while 
preserving the authority of other entities in the system.213  The foundation of 
this covenantal, federal system is the pre-existence of the state governments; 
while the people of the entire United States are collectively sovereign,214 the 
Constitution was written in the context of preexisting states, which—while 
forming an indissoluble union—did not part with their independent existence 
when the national government was created.215  Despite the mistaken opinions 
 
federalism.  After all, the latter was built upon the circumstances of the states existing as 
independent sovereigns that joined together to form the nation, the United States.”). 
 210.  Id.; see also supra, notes 18–21, 43 and accompanying text. 
 211.  The national government is given power over a specific range of subjects, see U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, and the remainder is vested in “the [s]tates respectively, or . . . the people,”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. X. 
 212.  Daniel J. Elazar, The United States and the European Union: Models for Their Epochs, in 
THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 31, 42 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).  In this way, the 
American system is different from other systems of decentralized government: 
Historically, [the European tradition of] subsidiarity has assumed that there is 
a centre of power that rules over an organic or quasi-organic polity . . . .  
[Whereas] the American federal tradition has assumed that there is not, and 
should not be, a single centre of power.  The States are not peripheries, and 
local governments are not extremities; they are constituent elements of what 
James Madison called a “compound republic.” 
John Kincaid, Devolution in the United States: Rhetoric and Reality, in THE FEDERAL VISION: 
LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
144, 155 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse, eds. 2001). 
 213.  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Framers of our Constitution intended Congress to have sufficient power to 
address national problems. . . .  [T]hey also envisioned a republic whose vitality was assured by the 
diffusion of power not only among the branches of the Federal Government, but also between the 
Federal Government and the States.”). 
 214.  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 839–40 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 215.  See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 724−25 (1868) (“[T]he perpetuity and indissolubility of 
the Union, by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-
government by the States. . . . The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible 
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of those courts that view cities as always and everywhere creatures of the 
state, the same relationship of preexistence and indissolubility exists 
between the states and the cities within their territory.216  In California, the 
court has explicitly recognized this pre-existing tradition of local 
government217 and the resulting relationship between the sovereign people, 
the state, and cities: 
It is of course true that [municipal affairs] . . . may at all times be 
controlled by the sovereign power.  But it does not follow that the 
legislative department of the state may so control it. . . . The state 
constitution is . . . the highest expression of the will of the people of 
the state, and so far as it speaks, represents the state. So, where . . . 
power is given in the constitutional method by special charter, and 
not by direct legislative enactment, it can be withdrawn only by 
amendment to the charter in the manner provided by the 
constitution.218 
The implications of divided sovereignty are not always obvious, even in the 
context of federalism.219  However, the American legal tradition is replete 
with examples of courts parsing the meaning of federalism and its legal 
implications.  Because the political theory of home rule is analogous to that 
of federalism, several of these legal doctrines are useful in illuminating the 
Municipal Affairs Clause. 
The municipal affairs doctrine is clearly analogous to the “traditional 
state functions” doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery.220  The terms 
 
Union, composed of indestructible States.”). 
 216.  People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 98 (1871) (“[T]he [state] constitution has 
been adopted in view of a system of local government, well understood and tolerably uniform in 
character, existing from the very earliest settlement of the country, never for a moment suspended or 
displaced, and the continued existence of which is assumed; and . . . the liberties of the people have 
generally been supposed to spring from, and be dependent upon that system.”). 
 217.  See People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 29–31 (1875). 
 218.  Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 211 (1903). 
 219.  One commentator has quipped that “[t]alking about federalism feels a bit like joining the 
proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant.”  Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1485 (1994).  For an entertaining version of the story to which Kramer refers, 
see John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED BOOK OF 
AMERICAN CHILDREN’S POEMS 24–25 (Donald Hall ed., 1999). 
 220.  426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528 (1985). 
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“municipal affairs” and “traditional governmental functions” both rely for 
their meaning on the nature of the entity whose independence is being 
protected—a thing is a “municipal affair” if it is properly handled by a 
municipality,221 and a thing is a “traditional governmental function” if it is 
handled traditionally by the states.222  In National League, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act could not be 
applied to state governments.223  The Court based its decision on what it took 
to be an established principle that the “power of Congress to override state 
sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to 
regulate commerce” has limits.224  These limits include the principle that the 
states’ “integrity” and ability to function as separate governments must be 
respected.225  The Court held that, under the Tenth Amendment, states 
retained the “freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional 
governmental functions” absent a particularly compelling federal interest.226  
This legal doctrine, designed to protect state autonomy within the federal 
system, has been abrogated, and the Court has left the protection of 
traditional state functions to the national legislative process.227  The notion of 
“traditional state functions” proved too nebulous for the courts to properly 
enforce,228 and more importantly—though it supposedly derived from the 
Tenth Amendment—the doctrine did not have a textual basis.229  The 
municipal affairs doctrine, however, is explicitly present in the text of the 
 
 221.  Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209 (1903) 
 222.  National League, 426 U.S. at 851–52 (listing examples). 
 223.  Id. at 855. 
 224.  Id. at 842. 
 225.  Id. at 843. 
 226.  Id. at 852, 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the Court “adopts a balancing 
approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the 
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal 
standards would be essential”). 
 227.  George A. Bermann, The Role of Law in the Functioning of Federal Systems, in THE 
FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 191, 202 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001); see Garcia, 469 U.S. 
at 551–52. 
 228.  See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531. 
 229.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547–49.  Even acknowledging this textual 
ambiguity, Justice O’Connor dissented in a stirring opinion that chastised the Court for “retreat[ing] 
rather than reconcil[ing] the Constitution’s dual concerns for federalism and an effective commerce 
power.”  Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Likewise, Justice Powell accused the Court of 
“reduc[ing] the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric.”  Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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state constitution.230  Whether or not Justice Cooley was correct that the 
framers of state constitutions never intended to give up local control of local 
affairs, it is clear, in California at least, that the people intended to take such 
power back.231  Furthermore, the common law distinction favored by the 
Ashworth and Henshaw dissenters is much more workable than the National 
League doctrine.  The rule is abstract and based on the territorial reach of 
legislation rather than ad hoc divisions of labor based on competing 
interests, which means it will not become obsolete as governmental practices 
at the state and local level develop.  If the California Supreme Court were to 
adopt such a rule, a doctrine similar to that of National League, based on 
ascertainable historical facts about state and local government, should be 
employed to clarify the distinction. 
Another useful doctrinal analogy between home rule and federalism is 
the rule that, while Congress often is possessed of the constitutional 
authority to regulate a matter that is within the competence of a state, it may 
not simply commandeer the machinery of the state government to do so.232  
It may set up its own enforcement regime or it may provide incentives for 
the states to comply, but it may not compel the states to act.233  While the no-
commandeering doctrine is not directly stated in the text of the constitution, 
it is plausible as a legal doctrine because of the intuition that a government 
without control of its own internal processes and officers is not a separate 
government at all.234  Commandeering is an apt description for the kind of 
legislative control exercised over California’s city governments under 
Dillon’s rule, and the California Supreme Court made clear that this 
commandeering was based on a political theory—that cities were not 
legitimate, separate institutions of government but merely arms of the 
 
 230.  CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). 
 231.  People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880) (“It was manifestly the intention of [the people] to 
emancipate municipal governments from the authority and control formerly exercised over them by 
the Legislature, and this is the more apparent in view of the fact that the charter framed by . . . the 
vote of the people, cannot be amended by the Legislature.”). 
 232.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 153–54, 161 (1992) (striking down a federal 
statute that compelled the individual states to either pass legislation which complied with minimum 
federal standards or be subject to sanctions which included a “take title” provision—vesting title to 
nuclear waste, and all the liability that it implied, in the state). 
 233.  Id. at 188.  This constitutional prohibition applies to the executive as well as the legislative 
functions of the state.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). 
 234.  See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. 
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state.235  The people of California, however, rejected that political theory 
when they affirmed that a city “may frame a charter for its own government” 
which “shall become the organic law thereof.”236  Just as the people of a state 
have the right to operate their own government and have the integrity of that 
government respected by the nation, the people of a city have the right to 
operate their own government and have the integrity of that government 
respected by the state.237 
But the federal government is not without recourse to set policy at the 
state level in pursuit of federal interests.  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged Congress’s broad authority to place conditions on the use of 
funds it provides under its power to tax and spend for the general welfare.238  
This power to set conditions permits the federal government to influence 
state policy so long as it does not “dragoon[]” the states with punitive and 
coercive conditions.239  Just as the no-commandeering doctrine does not 
leave the federal government without a role in setting state policy, the 
analogous principle of home rule does not leave the statewide government 
without a role in setting local policy.  The California Supreme Court has 
made clear that the state has an interest, sufficient to render a charter city 
subject to general laws, in deciding how state money is spent.240  The 
authority of the state to dictate local policy in charter cities, however, 
depends upon an implicit bargain in which the charter city agrees to exercise 
its authority over municipal affairs in a particular way and the state agrees in 
turn to provide the necessary funds.241  If the state does not provide the 
 
 235.  See Pattison v. Bd. of Supervisors, 13 Cal. 175, 184 (1859) (“[Cities and counties] are both 
political and geographical divisions of the State.  They are both the subjects of its political dominion.  
The local governments derive their powers from the paramount political head, which, while it cedes 
to certain local agents certain powers, does not thereby remit its rightful and ultimate dominion . . . 
.”). 
 236.  CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, § 8 (emphasis added). 
 237.  See People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 (1875). 
 238.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . 
and provide for . . . [the] general Welfare of the United States . . . .”); see, e.g., South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 239.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2574 (2012). 
 240.  See State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 562 
(2012). 
 241.  The United States Supreme Court, in some of its recent cases on the subject, has expressed 
this theory of funding conditions set by Congress.  See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. 
v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 
1, 17 (1981)) (holding, based on the contractual theory, that Congress must provide unambiguous 
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funds, the city has the prerogative of deciding how it will use its own 
money.242 
These doctrines, derived from the nature our federalist system, are 
applicable by analogy to the law of municipal home rule.  Just as the United 
States Supreme Court once held that the independent sovereignty of the 
states prevented Congress from regulating them “as states,”243 the California 
Constitution’s protection of cities as independent entities should be 
construed to “inhibit[] . . . any legislation which would directly affect cities 
and towns as municipal corporations.”244  The state legislature must legislate 
by “general laws” rather than “laws general in form,” which serve only to 
nullify the political choices embodied in city charters.245  Just as the United 
States Supreme Court continues to hold that the states may not be 
commandeered by Congress to achieve its ends through them, it should also 
be taken as a clear implication of the independent existence of cities under 
the California Constitution that they may not be commandeered by the 
legislature and compelled to fulfill its purposes for it.246  And finally, just as 
the United States Supreme Court has held that Congress’s power to regulate 
the states through spending conditions is limited,247 the California Supreme 
Court should limit the state’s power to regulate cities through spending 
conditions by requiring a direct connection between the funds being granted 
or denied and the condition being exacted.248  The court should employ these 
doctrines, along with the common law distinction between local and general 
laws, which taken together provide a coherent doctrine of municipal home 
rule. 
 
notice of the conditions imposed); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185–87 (2002). 
 242.  See Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 559.  The same general principle, that state regulation 
should be accompanied by state money if it is to be imposed on local governments, is embodied in 
the state constitution’s subvention requirement.  See CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 6. 
 243.  Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976) (emphasis added), overruled in 
part by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 244.  Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 402 (1899) (Temple, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 245.  CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a); Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461 (1899). 
 246.  Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992), with Trades Council, 54 
Cal. 4th 547, 561–62. 
 247.  See supra notes 234–39 and accompanying text. 
 248.  Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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VI. THE CASE FOR CLARITY 
A. Principle: The Separation of Powers and Political Accountability 
Replacing the Federal Savings analysis with the rule suggested here 
would confine the legislature to its constitutionally intended role and give 
the courts a firm basis for restraint of the “mercurial discretion” that has 
unfortunately characterized home rule doctrine.249  The design of the state 
constitution, as understood by its drafters, calls for the legislature to play a 
limited role, especially in local issues.250  Many of the drafters even 
understood the restriction of legislative involvement in local issues to be the 
entire purpose of the convention.251  They envisioned a legislature which 
devoted itself to “the perfecting of the Codes” and the decision of general 
questions about the rights and obligations of citizens, leaving matters of 
local concern and city government in the hands of cities.252  The distinction 
between general laws and local laws would encourage that division of labor, 
and the democratic accountability it strengthens, by requiring the legislature 
to act through its own broad regulatory power rather than politically 
insulating itself by commandeering the apparatus of local government.  
Furthermore, by applying this distinction even-handedly, the courts could 
relieve themselves of the obligation to “adjust[] the conflict” between state 
and local governments “on [each case’s] own facts” without guidance from 
the constitution and confine itself to applying workable legal standards.253 
B. Practicality: Cooperative Localism 
In June of 1978, the people of California enacted the Jarvis-Gann 
initiative constitutional amendment, commonly known as Proposition 13, in 
response to excessive local property taxes that steadily rose due to 
inflationary pressures on the real estate market.254  When the legality of the 
initiative was tested in the supreme court, a school district unsuccessfully 
asserted that it was unconstitutional as a fundamental change to the “basic 
 
 249.  Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 16 (1991). 
 250.  See 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 750 (Mr. Reynolds). 
 251.  See, e.g., 3 id. at 1406–07 (Mr. Hager). 
 252.  2 id. at 750 (Mr. Reynolds). 
 253.  Federal Savings, 54 Cal. 3d at 15–16. 
 254.  See generally GRODIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 259. 
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governmental plan” of the constitution, which had to be initiated by the 
legislature.255  While the court rejected the district’s argument,256 a major 
change in California government did result from Proposition 13: state 
funding of local government increased to substitute for the funds lost as a 
result of the limitations.257 
In light of this fiscal reality, the direct impact of Trades Council on the 
state and local power relationship will be minimal, because the holding of 
the case only applies to projects funded entirely out of local revenues.258  But 
the indirect impact of reviving the original, textual meaning of the Municipal 
Affairs Clause would be to preserve the possibility of local independence.  
Some scholars of cooperative federalism have argued that the states are able 
to participate in the creation of policy despite the growth of the federal 
government primarily because they are capable of withdrawing their support 
and making implementation more difficult.259  This kind of give and take, 
which Professor Heather Gerken calls “uncooperative federalism,” has 
enabled the states to resist and modify federal policy delegated to them for 
enforcement.260  The ability of a peripheral government to resist central 
authority, according to Gerken, derives partly from the impracticality of the 
central authority micromanaging the enforcement.261  But an additional 
source of potential influence derives from the split nature of the state 
official’s loyalties and the dual sources of his power.262  The state official is 
answerable to the state electorate as well as the federal government, and he 
may draw upon the political and monetary resources of the state to support 
his resistance to federal power.263  Both of these sources of power would be 
nullified, however, if the federal government was capable of commandeering 
 
 255.  Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 224 
(1978). 
 256.  See id. 
 257.  Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisited: A Proposal for Negotiated Modification of Public 
Sector Bargaining Agreements Rejected Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 
231, 303 (1985) (“Revenues lost after Proposition 13 [were] replaced largely by surplus funds from 
the state treasury, and the actual shortfalls were much less than were anticipated . . . .”). 
 258.  See 54 Cal.4th at 559. 
 259.  Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1270–84 (2009). 
 260.  Id. at 1271–84. 
 261.  See id. at 1266–67. 
 262.  See id. at 1270–71. 
 263.  See id. 
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the machinery of the state government to achieve its purposes in strict 
detail.264  The state official would have no resources to employ that the 
central authority could not simply take from him or compel him to use in the 
way it sees fit.265  The same fate would befall cities if the courts do not 
sustain their right to withhold their cooperation from state programs like the 
prevailing wage law for their own reasons. 
VII.  TRADES COUNCIL AND SB7 
The California Supreme Court, applying the Federal Savings analysis, 
found that the Public Wage Rate Act could not be enforced against a charter 
city.266  What remains unclear is whether it would find SB7 unconstitutional 
under that analysis.  However, if the court adopted the rule proposed in this 
Comment, derived from the text, purpose, and theory of the clause itself, 
both cases would be clear.  The court should hold that the Public Wage Rate 
Act could not be enforced against a charter city because it would be an 
unconstitutional commandeering of the city government’s contracting 
authority.  And it should hold that SB7 is unconstitutional because it is a 
coercive and punitive funding condition intended to dragoon charter cities 
into compliance. 
A. The Legislative Overreach of SB7 
On October 13, 2013, Governor Brown approved Senate Bill 7, a 
legislative response to the holding in Trades Council.267  The statute was 
passed specifically in response to that case268 and provides that “[a] charter 
city shall not receive or use state funding or financial assistance for a 
construction project if the city has a charter provision or ordinance that 
authorizes a contractor to not comply with the provisions of this article on 
any public works contract.”269  The statute also repeats the economic 
justifications for the prevailing wage law, citing the enhancement of wages 
and training opportunities to support the construction industry and maintain 
 
 264.  See id. 
 265.  See id. 
 266.  See supra, notes 136–45 and accompanying text. 
 267.  2013 Cal. Stat. 794 (SB7), codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §1782 (2014). 
 268.  See id. at §1(f). 
 269.  CAL. LAB. CODE §1782(a). 
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middle-class jobs.270  It asserts that some charter cities do comply with the 
prevailing wage law and that those cities provide a state-wide benefit that 
justifies providing funding to them only and not to cities that do not.271  This 
is referred to as a “financial incentive”272 and asserted to be a minor and 
justifiable burden.  The League of California Cities disagrees.  When the 
governor signed the bill, the League issued a press release declaring that the 
important issue is not the value of the prevailing wage law but “whether the 
legislation undermines the constitutional powers that California voters more 
than 100 years ago conferred on charter cities and their voters alone.”273  
That is the issue, and the resolution of that issue may turn on how the court 
articulates the applicable law. 
B. Analyzing SB7 Under Federal Savings 
The first issue in applying the Federal Savings analysis to the statute is 
whether it “can be characterized as” a municipal affair.274  Because it 
purports only to determine which cities the state wishes to provide funds to, 
the state may argue that no municipal affair is involved. Just as the use of 
municipal funds is a municipal affair, the use of state funds is a matter of 
statewide concern.275  However, to assert that this statute is merely about 
legislative funding priorities is pure chicanery.  The only way it affects the 
state’s spending priorities is to make the implicit judgment that coercing 
charter cities into foregoing their constitutional authority is a higher priority 
than distributing public works funding according to actual infrastructural 
needs.  For this reason, the court should find, even under the Federal 
Savings analysis, that the statute concerns a municipal affair.  It is clearly 
intended to overturn Trades Council’s holding by statute, and to allow it to 
do so would be to subordinate the state constitution to the legislature. 
But the legislature does not always broadcast its intent to undo a 
 
 270.  2013 Cal. Stat. 794, §1(a)–(d). 
 271.  Id. at §1(g)–(j). 
 272.  Id. at §1(j). 
 273.  Press Release, League of California Cities, Statement on Governor Brown's Signing of SB 7 
(Steinberg) (Oct. 14, 2013), available at http://www.cacities.org/Top/News/Press-Releases/ 
2013/October/League-of-California-Cities%E2%80%99-Statement-on-Governor [hereinafter Press 
Release]. 
 274.  State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 557 (2012). 
 275.  Id. at 561–62. 
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constitutional decision as it has done in this case.276  Applying the rule 
proposed in this Comment, the court could protect constitutional home rule 
even in a less clear case. 
C. Analyzing the Public Wage Rate Act Under the Proposed Rule 
If the court had applied the proposed rule in deciding Trades Council, 
the result would have been the same.  The application of the Public Wage 
Rate Act to charter cities would be unconstitutional for two reasons.  First, 
the prevailing wage law, as applied, would constitute a local law.  At first 
glance, it may appear that the act is a general law, because it concerns 
contractual obligations—a valid subject of general legislation.277  But the act 
does not in fact concern the law of contracts, it concerns government 
contracts qua government contracts—the ways in which government 
contracts differ from private contracts.278  The rationale of such legislation is 
not to enable bargaining between market participants, but to restrain public 
market participants so that “government contractors [are] not . . . allowed to 
circumvent locally prevailing labor market conditions by importing cheap 
labor from other areas.”279  The case is distinguishable from the statute 
upheld in Ex parte Braun, because while that law established the right of all 
persons within the state to be free of taxation upon their occupation, the 
Prevailing Wage Act directs the actions of public agencies only and has no 
general application to all the people of the state.280  As applied to state 
agencies, it is clearly a general law, applicable beyond the territory of any 
city.  But as applied to charter cities, it is merely a law “general in form”281 
that concerns the internal affairs of the city and thus falls within the 
 
 276.  2013 Cal. Stat. 794, §1(f). 
 277.  See Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 92 (1887) (McKinstry, J., dissenting) (listing among 
the proper subjects of general legislation “the mode of contracting”). 
 278.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1720 (West 2013). 
 279.  Indep. Roofing Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 23 Cal. App. 4th 345, 
356 (1994) (quoted in State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 
555 (2012)). 
 280.  Compare Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 219 (1903) (Beatty, C.J., dissenting), with  Trades 
Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 589 (Liu, J., dissenting).  On this same theory, the court could have reached 
the result it did in Federal Savings, because in that case the law merely established the rights of 
private parties to be free of taxation in excess of the state income tax.  See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 6–7 (1991). 
 281.  Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461 (1899). 
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narrowest proposed definition of municipal affairs.282 
The act is also unconstitutional under the rule against commandeering.  
Even the Trades Council dissenters admitted what in substance the 
prevailing wage law does: 
[T]he Legislature has chosen to influence [construction 
industry] wages through the market-based approach of 
directing the purchasing power of public entities to support 
union-level wages. . . . [This] represents a legislative 
judgment that direct regulation of private labor markets is 
not necessary to accomplish the statute’s goals given the 
substantial role that public works projects play in 
influencing private sector construction workers’ wages and 
in supporting apprenticeship programs.283 
This is the real issue regarding the Prevailing Wage Act.  While the state 
may choose to use its own money to achieve its economic policy goals rather 
than enact burdensome regulation on the private sector, it may not choose to 
use the resources of another government to achieve those goals.284  Freedom 
from this kind of commandeering is “the heart of what it means to be an 
independent governmental entity.”285  As the League of California Cities has 
argued,286 the state asserts this very principle when defending its own 
independence, as demonstrated by its recent complaint against the United 
States Department of Labor.287  In its complaint, the state accuses the federal 
government of presenting “California with a Hobson’s choice—change its 
pension reform legislation or forgo more than $1 billion of federal transit 
funds,” which “undermine[s] the independent fiscal and legislative 
sovereignty of California . . . .”288   In that case, the state correctly ascertains 
the issue: “Only California elected officials may spend California's 
money.”289  The same principle applies to charter cities. 
 
 282.  See Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387 (1899) (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 283.  54 Cal. 4th at 587–89 (Liu, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 284.  See id. at 562 (majority opinion). 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  See Press Release, supra note 273. 
 287.  Complaint, California v. United States Department of Labor (13-CV-02069), 2013 WL 
5548885 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013). 
 288.  Id. at ¶94. 
 289.  Id. at ¶97. 
[Vol. 41: 587, 2014] Preserving Home Rule 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
630 
D. Analyzing SB7 Under the Proposed Rule 
Because the holding of Trades Council applies only to projects funded 
entirely without state support, the legislature is fully capable of achieving its 
substantive goal by working cooperatively with local governments and 
providing the funds necessary to pay the higher wage rates.290  But SB7, the 
recently passed legislation designed to enforce the prevailing wage law 
against charter cities, opts instead for fiscal coercion—withholding revenue 
from taxes paid by all taxpayers unless the city capitulates to terms the state 
could not have forced on them by statute.  Applying the restriction on 
funding conditions set by Congress, the Supreme Court recently found a 
similar provision unconstitutional.291  The California Supreme Court, in 
defending a similar constitutional doctrine, should reach a similar result.  For 
the state to legitimately place conditions on funds, those conditions should 
actually relate to the use of the funds. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
While it protected the home rule autonomy of the City of Vista in 
Trades Council, the California Supreme Court continues to interpret the 
Municipal Affairs Clause in a case-by-case fashion that undermines certainty 
and the rule of law.292  Justice MacFarland’s prophecy in Ex parte Braun has 
proven self-fulfilling, and the court since Federal Savings has not attempted 
to ground its analysis in the clause itself.293  Instead, it gives deference to the 
legislature and decides each case on its own facts.294  But the history of 
California’s constitution demonstrates that it was skepticism of the 
 
 290.  See id. 
 291.  Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (“Nothing in our 
opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the 
availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions 
on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in 
that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”) 
 292.  See supra notes 124–65 and accompanying text. 
 293.  Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 16 (1991) (“The idea that the 
content of ‘municipal affairs’ is indefinite in its essentials is one that has taken root in our cases on 
the subject.”); Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 214 (1903) (McFarland, J., concurring) (“[N]o doubt, 
in the future each case involving the question will be decided on its own facts, without an attempt at 
generalization.”). 
 294.  See State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal., AFL-CIO v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 
547, 557–58 (2012). 
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legislature and the desire for settled, clear, and expansive protection of local 
self-government that motivated the creation of the Constitution of 1879 and 
the Municipal Affairs Amendment in 1896.295  The court once attempted to 
interpret the clause based upon the people’s intent, and it may do so again.296  
Guided by the text, purpose, and political theory of the Municipal Affairs 
Clause, the court has the obligation to preserve California’s system of 
divided sovereignty and ensure that the people’s right to local self-
government is preserved by the constitution they have framed for its 
preservation.297 
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